We 
Introduction
The success of the Internet as a viable channel for commerce depends on achieving a critical mass of users willing to make purchases using the channel. However, examination of the growth in the number of Internet users indicates that adoption has not been uniform across all segments of society, creating what has come to be called the "digital divide." Empirical studies have investigated the existence of the divide according to several different individual characteristics including race, gender, level of education, and age [4, 5] . The findings from the recent 2003 Pew Internet and American Life project [10] show that:
• the percentage of whites and Hispanics who have online access is about six to twelve percent higher than African-Americans with similar education; • 82% of college graduates use the Internet, but only 45% of those with a high school diploma are online;
• of non-Internet users, half are over age 50, compared with just 14% being between 18 and 29. 1 The presence of the digital divide should be a concern for all members of society; whether it be policy makers seeking to promote societal welfare, educators concerned with the intellectual development of those without access, or online sellers that seek to increase their marketing base.
The digital divide exists, in part, because individuals differ in their propensity to try out and adopt new innovations such as the Internet. Rogers [13] outlines several key characteristics that distinguish early innovation adopters from late adopters. These characteristics can be grouped into three different categories: socioeconomic characteristics, personality variables, and communication behaviors. Among other things, early innovation adopters have more education, have higher socioeconomic status, are more interconnected via interpersonal networks, are more cosmopolitan, have more exposure to mass media, and have more contact with change agents who promote the innovation. As the Pew project indicates, those with Internet access are more likely to live in better suburban neighborhoods as opposed to the less connected who tend to reside in inner city or rural areas. The fear that we are creating two societies-an online society where children are "growing up digital" with rich access to online information resources, and an offline society where there is limited or no access to such information-has profound implications [15] .
It would seem that bridging the digital divide is an important goal if electronic commerce is to grow into a widely accepted form of commerce. However, bridging the divide may have certain negative consequences that have not considered. In particular, under certain conditions a seller may find that the digital divide acts as a market segmenting mechanism that can lessen the distortion caused by the classic cannibalization problem. For sellers operating both Internet and brickand-mortar storefronts, channel conflict is a difficult problem that requires different strategies in the two channels. Without taking into account the response of sellers to the digital divide, policy makers may not be fully informed. For example, online/offline market segmentation is seen in the market for personal computers where several manufacturers are attempting to simultaneously sell in traditional brick-and-mortar electronics retail stores and through the direct channel via their company Web sites. Products offered on the Web site are typically high-end workstations and servers, while those sold at retail electronic stores are typically slower, low-end processors. In fact, many of the low-end products found in the physical store are not available in the online storefront. Even when a new processor is introduced into the online store, rather than add the new model to its existing product line, the manufacturer will often remove the slowest machine previously offered online-even though the slower model is readily available in the brick-and-mortar store. While there are several reasons for this, including the time difference of moving inventory through the two channels, sellers in multiple channels know that different clientele in each channel requires different quality and pricing levels appropriate for each group. In particular, the seller may remove low end products from its online store to keep the high type online consumer's attention focused on the more profitable powerful desktop models, rather than cannibalize these sales. Understanding the incentives for all involved parties and the distribution of benefits of a policy to bridge the divide is critical as we move forward to broader adoption of e-commerce and the Internet. This paper will examine the implications of a firm that sells its goods in a multi-channel marketplace where action is taken to bridge the divide. Specifically, we develop an analytical separating equilibrium model examining the pricing and quality levels of a firm that sells in two channels simultaneously-an online channel and an offline channel. Prior analytical modeling has examined the classic cannibalization problem that can exist when high and low type consumers exist in the same shopping channel [6, 9, 14] . In the present analysis, we show how the digital divide artificially segments the marketplace allowing the seller to more efficiently market its goods to each consumer segment, thereby mitigating the cannibalization problem. Subsequently bridging the divide increases the distortion from the cannibalization problem, causing the seller to lower the quality of the low quality product in the physical store. Indeed, we show conditions under which low type consumers are initially served in the offline channel, but subsequently bridging the divide results in low types not being served in either channel. We extend the model to examine the implications of bridging the divide when the seller uses delay by offering product introductions in sequential periods.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant literature upon which we construct our model. The formal model is developed in §3, where we examine the seller's optimal selling strategies in the face of the digital divide and examine the implications of bridging the divide. We expand the model in §4 where we examine the use of intertemporal price discrimination with the existence of the digital divide. We conclude with a summary of our findings in §5.
Previous Modeling
Several researchers have examined pricing strategies of sellers that practice intertemporal price discrimination or that operate in multiple channels simultaneously. Stokey [14] showed how a monopolist could use delay as a way of selling to multiple consumers who have differing reservation prices. Landsberger and Meilijson [6] built on that idea to show that intertemporal price discrimination works when the seller and buyers have different discount rates. Conner [2] illustrates how a firm may spend aggressively on research and development to create a new version of an old product, and then delay introduction of the new product until the old one is challenged by a competitor. Besanko and Winston [1] model the monopolist's optimal timing and pricing strategy in the introduction of a new product when consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers versus being myopic. They show that prices are always lower when consumers act rationally as opposed to myopic, which allows the seller to practice intertemporal price discrimination. Similarly, Levinthal and Purohit [7] show how expectation of a future product improvement cannibalizes sales of the current version of the product. They show conditions under which the seller should phase out the old product versus instituting a buy-back policy when the new product is introduced.
Purohit [11] develops a two-period model of a manufacturer that markets its goods in a multi channel setting. By comparing an automotive rental agency structure versus a dealership structure, he determines the profitability of a manufacturer under three different channel scenarios to best coordinate rental and dealership relationships. Zettelmeyer [16] examines how the size of the Internet affects the firm's pricing and communications strategies. He shows that when the Internet is relatively small in size, firms will provide more information online and prices will be lower than in conventional channels. However, as the number of users on the Internet increases, the amount of information the firm provides through the Internet channel and the firm's online pricing policy will eventually become similar to that in the conventional channel.
Mason and Milne [8] conduct an empirical study of the cigarette industry to show how the proliferation of brands results in cannibalization of other product lines, leading firms to reduce the number of brands they sell. They develop a method of identifying the degree of cannibalization in mature retail markets.
The current analysis is most closely related to Moorthy and Png [9] who develop a model of separating equilibrium in a single-channel market. They consider a monopolist that produces a durable product that can be differentiated along some dimension of "quality". The monopolist sells to a market that is made up of high and low type consumers, where high types have a higher valuation for a given level of quality than low type consumers. In this situation, the seller will produce two versions of the product to be targeted at the two consumer segments. Because of the lack of information about a specific consumer's type, the seller must practice second-degree price discrimination and price the two products such that the consumers self-select into their appropriate market segments. The cannibalization problem arises because the seller is not able to prohibit the high type consumer from buying the low quality good. The authors show that the optimal solution to the problem is to give high type consumers a price discount and lower the quality (and corresponding price) of the low quality good to the point that high type consumers are not interested in that version of the product. Depending upon the relative consumer valuations of the good, it is possible that the seller may need to lower the quality of the low quality product to the point that it essentially doesn't exist. In that case, the cannibalization problem is so strong that low type consumers are not served in the marketplace.
This distortion in the marketplace due to product cannibalization essentially has two important effects on the market. First, low type consumer choice is reduced since they receive a lower quality product, and in fact may not be served at all if the cannibalization potential is high enough. Second, this distortion lowers the profits of the seller who must contend with the moral hazard problem associated with second-degree price discrimination. To combat the cannibalization distortion, the seller may employ intertemporal price discrimination by offering the high quality good at an earlier point in time than the low quality good. By using delay to degrade the low quality good, the seller may be able to mitigate the cannibalization problem if consumers are sufficiently impatient relative to the seller. In the next section, we extend the Moorthy and Png [9] model by allowing the seller to sell in two channels at the same time.
A Multi-Channel Model
We consider the seller's problem where the seller markets its goods in two channels simultaneously, the online (Internet) channel (I) and an offline (brick-andmortar) channel (B). The seller sells a durable good that can be differentiated according to some dimension of quality, q. There are two types of consumer segments in the market, h and l, where n h is the number of high types and n l is the number of low types. Further, high type consumers value a given level of quality q at v h q, while low types value the same item at v l q. Let v h > v l > 0 such that high types value a given level of quality more than low types. Let
where R is a measure of the degree of cannibalization as shown in [9] . Finally, assume that a consumer buys at most one unit of the durable good and then exits the marketplace.
Due to a favorable online cost structure, we assume that the marginal cost of providing an additional good in the online channel is less than or equal to the marginal cost of an additional good in the offline channel. This cost is the cost of developing and bringing a product of quality q to market. The cost of developing a product of quality q should not differ regardless of which channel it is sold in, however the costs of bringing the product to market should differ. First, the transaction costs of delivering a product in the online channel should be lower than the physical channel. Even more importantly for this analysis, for a product of a particular quality q, other costs such as requirements for physically packaging, handling, shipping, storing, and securing goods should be higher in the physical channel as well. In addition, costs for insuring, displaying, and maintaining qualified sales persons to explain the product should be higher in the physical channel. Therefore, we assume that the costs of developing and bringing a product to market of quality q is higher in the physical channel than in the online channel, and that this difference increases as product quality increases. Therefore, the seller can market the good in the online channel and/or the offline channel, where the marginal cost of supplying one unit with quality q is c i q 2 and c b q 2 respectively, where
Let α and β be the fraction of low and high type consumers, respectively, who have migrated to the online channel. In the current analysis, we assume that a particular consumer shops in only one channel and her decision to remain in the offline channel or migrate to the online channel is independent of the market for the one durable good under consideration. This assumption simplifies the analysis, however, the results would still hold if we assumed a consumer type has a certain propensity to shop either online versus offline. Specifically, the general results found in this analysis hold if consumers who have gone online are less likely to purchase in physical stores than their similar counterparts who do not have online access. Based on empirical and theoretical grounds, we assume that a digital divide potentially exists, i.e. 0 < α < β < 1, such that high type consumers migrate to the online channel of commerce faster than low type consumers. When some portion of high and low type consumers are located in both channels, i.e., when 0 < α < β < 1, the seller will potentially sell high and low quality versions of the good in both channels. Therefore, with two consumer segments and two channels, there can be at most four "products" or levels of qualities-a high quality good offered online targeted to high type consumers, a high quality good offered offline targeted to the high types, a low quality good offered online to the low type consumers, and a low quality good offered offline to the low types. Due to the difference in costs between the two channels, the high (low) quality good offered online need not be the same as the high (low) quality good offered offline. Indeed, we can calculate the efficient qualities of the four products as the qualities that maximize the difference between the targeted customer's valuation and the firm's marginal cost of quality. Specifically, the efficient qualities for the four products are • high quality good offered in the online channel
• high quality good offered in the offline channel
• low quality good offered in the online channel
• low quality good offered in the offline channel
The efficient levels of quality are shown in Figure (6) and (7) are the self-selection constraints for the two consumer segments in the two channels. Since the seller must practice second-degree price discrimination, he must set the quality and price levels so that each segment chooses the appropriate quality and price offering. Constraints (8) and (9) are the participation constraints that ensure that each consumer type will participate in the market.
As pointed out in [9] , because high type consumers value a given level of quality more than low types, the seller cannot extract all of the consumer surplus from both types by binding constraints (8) and (9) at the same time. If this were the case, the high type consumers would forgo purchasing the high quality good and instead purchase the low quality good, thereby gaining some positive surplus. Instead, the seller will bind constraint (8) (10) Also, the seller should set the price for the high quality goods so that the high types in each channel are indifferent between the high quality good and the low quality good. This is accomplished by making constraint (7) bind and then using (10), such that 
The four terms in equation (14) represent the profit from selling to low types online, high types online, low types offline, and high types offline, respectively. This four-product solution is feasible, if and only if 0 > i l q , i.e., when
, the seller is able to increase profits by lowering the quality of the low quality online product, and does so until the point that it essentially doesn't exist-the low type consumer is not served in the online market. However, a threeproduct solution is feasible where the low type segment is still served in the offline marketplace
, which occurs as long as
, the seller again is able to increase profits by lowering the quality of the low quality offline product until the point that the low type consumer is not served in either channel, resulting in a two-product solution. In terms of selling to the high type consumers, the seller should supply the high types their efficient qualities from (1) and (2) and price them according to (11) . In the appropriate regions, profits are increased as Notice that the profits reduce to the Moorthy and Png [9] case when c b = c i and when α = β. Our purpose here is not to duplicate that analysis for the multichannel case, but rather examine the implications of the digital divide. If 0 < α < β < 1, the seller's strategy can be determined from equation (15) . If
, the seller will sell high and low quality goods in both channels, which we call the "Sell 4" strategy. If
, the seller can increase profits by lowering the quality of the low quality good online, and will do so to the point that it does not exist-the low type consumer will only be served in the offline The seller's strategy is readily illustrated in Figure   2 , where we show the case where β = .8. The three regions in Proposition 1 and equation (15) are labeled in Figure 2 as Sell 4, Sell 3, and Sell 2, which represent the number of unique product qualities offered. When R is relatively low, the threat of cannibalization is low, allowing the seller to sell to both consumer types in both channels, provided the digital divide is not too great. However, even when R is low, a huge digital divide will result in low types being served only in the offline market, since there would not be enough low type consumers in the online market to make it profitable for the seller to offer a low quality good online. When R is very large, the potential for cannibalization is so large that the seller will sell only to the high type consumers in both channels. Moorthy and Png [9] show that in the single-channel, one-period case, the seller will sell to both high and low types when R < 1, and only to the high type consumers when R > 1. In Figure 2 , this corresponds to the situation where α = β = .8 where the appropriate strategy is Sell 4 when R < 1, and Sell 2 when R > 1.
However, when α < β, the digital divide opens up a new opportunity for the low types to be served in the offline channel via the Sell 3 strategy. The greater the digital divide, the more the Sell 3 strategy dominates the seller's strategic options.
What is the impact of the digital divide on the seller's profits? It is easily shown that 0 ≥ ∂ Π ∂ β , such that having the high type consumers migrate to the online channel increases the seller's profits. This is so for two reasons. First, increasing the digital divide further segments the marketplace; thereby lessening the distortion due to cannibalization and increasing profits for the seller. In addition, the seller enjoys the cost advantages of selling to the high type consumers in the more efficient online market. However, bridging the digital divide by bringing more low type consumers into the online channel does not necessarily increase the seller's profits. This is because the seller benefits by selling to the low type consumers in the cost efficient online channel, but is harmed by the exacerbated cannibalization problem that results from unsegmenting the market as the high and low type consumers mix in both channels.
Consider equation (12) for the situation where β is considerably large relative to α. In that case, the high type consumers dominate the online commerce channel such that the seller is forced to lower the quality, i l q , of the low quality online good to keep the high types from cannibalizing sales of the high quality good. In this scenario, it is quite likely that the low types will not be served in the online channel as the seller sets q from equation (4) . Therefore, as more and more high types migrate from traditional brick-andmortar shopping environments to Web-based shopping, and thereby visit physical stores less frequently, we should expect to see physical stores raise the quality, and by (11) the corresponding price, of their discount merchandise. In this case, we see that the digital divide acts as a mitigating factor for the cannibalization problem that exists when different types of consumers co-exist in the same marketplace. The digital divide lessens, or may in fact eliminate, the distortion that occurs when high type consumers are tempted to The intuition is quite straightforward. When high type consumers are faster to adopt the innovation of Web-based shopping, the digital divide naturally segments the market into two channels: the online Internet channel where high quality goods are targeted to the high type adopters, and the offline brick-andmortar channel where low quality goods are targeted to low type consumers. When the two consumer types are segmented in this way, the low type consumers are served higher quality goods in the brick-and-mortar store because the seller is not forced to lower quality to avoid the cannibalization distortion.
The situation can be illustrated in Figure 3 . The assumption that α < β means that we need only concern ourselves with the area to the right of line AB.
Provided that
, we can summarize the key points as follows:
• at point A, no consumer has migrated to the online channel -the seller sells a high and low quality good in the offline channel only with the maximum cannibalization distortion; • at point B, all consumers have migrated to the online channel -the seller sells a high and low quality good in the online channel only with the maximum cannibalization distortion;
• along the diagonal from AB, there is no digital divide as an equal percentage of high and low types have migrated to the online channel-the seller may sell high and low quality goods in both channels with the maximum cannibalization distortion; • the distortion due to the cannibalization problem decreases as we move further from the AB diagonal; • at point C, the markets are perfectly segmented such that there is no distortion due to the cannibalization problem at all-the low types enjoy the efficient quality level in the offline channel and the seller's profits are maximized; • the solid/dashed arc beginning at point A is a hypothetical adoption path. Note that the distortion is minimized at point D for α * and β * ; • the dotted line indicates the hypothetical adoption path where an effort is made to bridge the digital divide. Note that the effort to bridge the digital divide rotates the arc counter-clockwise toward the AB diagonal, thus increasing the distortion due to the cannibalization problem. Now suppose the seller considers offering less than four different product offerings in the two channels. As shown in Figure 3 , if α = β = 0 (α = β = 1), the seller sells only in the offline (online) channel. If α = 0 and β = 1, the seller sells only the low quality good in the offline channel and only the high quality good in the online channel with no cannibalization distortion. If α = 0 and 0 < β < 1, the seller will sell the high quality good in both channels, will not sell any low quality goods online, and will sell a low quality good in the offline channel if (1-β) R < 1. If (1-β) R > 1, the low type consumer will not be served in either channel.
What happens when the potential for cannibalization is high and an effort is made to bridge the digital divide? Refer back to Figure 2 α , such that the seller pursues the Sell 3 strategy due to a combination of the cannibalization problem and the digital divide. In this case, a sufficient increase in α will force the seller to revert to the Sell 2 strategy. In other words, bridging the digital divide will force the seller to cease sales of the low quality good in the brick-and-mortar stores because of the cannibalization problem, but will not provide adequate incentives to begin sales of the low quality good in the online channel! This rather surprising result shows that conditions could exist where low type consumers were previously served in one channel, but bridging the digital divide could cause them to be not served in either channel. More formally, we can summarize this result in Proposition 3. Naturally the drive to bridge the digital divide is due to the belief that providing Internet access to low type consumers should have certain positive effects on these individuals. In particular, the Internet increases people's connectivity to information resources, other individuals, ideas and cultures, and new shopping experiences. Theoretically, bridging the digital divide potentially has two diametrically opposed long-term potential impacts on the cannibalization parameter, R, that are not taken into account in our model. We call this long-term change in R the moderating valuation effect. Referring back to Figure 2 , if R > 1, bridging the digital divide could move the seller from the Sell 3 strategy to the Sell 2 strategy. However, over a longer period of time, a reduction in R due to the moderating valuation effect would cause the seller to revert to the Sell 3 strategy and eventually to the Sell 4 strategy. A long-term increase in v l lessens the cannibalization problem and the ensuing distortion. Indeed, inspection of equation (14) On a more individual level, having access to the Internet may cause a low type consumer to adopt high type characteristics, essentially causing some low types to become high type consumers. If providing access to the Internet causes n l to decrease and n h to increase, the proportion of high types to low types, h l n , will increase, thereby increasing R. We call this long-term change in R the type transformation effect. Again, referring to Figure 2 , if R < 1, bridging the digital divide could move the seller from the Sell 3 strategy to the Sell 4 strategy. However, over a longer period of time, an increase in R due to the transformation of some low type consumers into high type consumers would cause the seller to revert to the Sell 3 strategy and eventually to the Sell 2 strategy thereby harming the remaining low type consumers. In this case, an increase in Whether the moderating valuation effect and/or the type transformation effect actually exist is an issue open to debate and empirical study. Longitudinal studies on the impact of Internet access on low type users is an important area for researchers to examine in the coming years.
Sequential Product Introductions
Moorthy and Png [9] extend their original model to examine the possibility that the seller introduces the high and low quality goods in different periods. Specifically, they show that if the consumers are relatively less patient than the seller, the cannibalization problem can be mitigated by offering the high quality good in the first period and the low quality good in the second period. Essentially, the seller uses sequential product introductions to make time another differentiating attribute along with product quality. They also show that when R is particularly large, the low type consumers may be served in an after-market when simultaneous product introductions would shut the low types out of the market. As stated earlier, our goal is not to duplicate their analysis, but rather investigate the implications of bridging the digital divide in the multi-channel context. We will consider case when the seller can pre-commit to future actions (for a discussion of the commitment versus no-commitment cases see [9] , [12] ).
In our case, the seller could choose to introduce products in two different periods by introducing the high quality goods in both channels in the first period in order to reap the profits from the higher-quality goods as soon as possible, followed by the low quality goods in period 2, if it is profitable to do so. The important point to notice is that when α < β, the seller can use time and/or the market segmentation due to the digital divide to mitigate the cannibalization problem, thereby increasing the quality of the low-end good and increasing profits. Unfortunately, the problem for the two-channel case becomes intractable if we try to solve for the specific conditions under which the seller offers products simultaneously or sequentially. However, we can state that market segmentation due to the digital divide has a similar effect on the marketplace as delayed product entry, which makes delaying the offering of the low quality good less attractive to the seller. It could well be the case that allowing the digital divide to exist allows the low type consumers to be served in the marketplace faster by providing the seller the Sell 3 option as shown in the previous section. Without the digital divide, the low type consumers may be forced to wait until a later time period for a product that is suitable for them.
Conclusion
In this analysis we have shown that efforts to bridge the digital divide could have some unforeseen consequences. While we recognize the societal value of bridging the divide, we also recognize certain inefficiencies may result. Specifically, we have shown that the digital divide artificially segments the marketplace into two distinct shopping channels. This allows a seller to more efficiently market its goods to Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -2004 different types of consumers-benefiting both the seller and the buyers. We have shown how bridging the divide can result in lower product quality or even no service for low type consumers when the likelihood of cannibalization of high quality goods is relatively high. The digital divide allows low type consumers to be served in the offline, brick-and-mortar channel when they otherwise might not be served at all.
We recognize this analysis is exploratory and limited by at least two assumptions. First, we assumed that the cost of providing a good of quality q is different in the two channels and that this difference increases as the quality increases. Empirical research should be done to examine the extent to which firms selling in multiple channels provide different levels of quality for otherwise similar goods. Second, we assumed that consumers shop in only one channel, which eliminates the possibility that those with online access will seek out product and price information online and then purchase offline. However, we have noted that the general results found in this paper will still hold provided those with online access visit physical stores less frequently than before the use of the online channel. Empirical work should examine this issue to see if this is the case. This analysis then provides a starting point for analyzing the way in which sellers that operate both online and offline storefronts may react to the existence of the digital divide and the different consumer segments in each channel. Further analytical modeling and empirical work is needed to better understand the seller's response, which would then guide policy makers seeking to encourage open and efficient market mechanisms.
